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Abstract. We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference
relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of
acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The prop-
erties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity
and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the
axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more indi-
viduals than alternatives, however, further rules become available. Journal of Economic
Literature Classiﬁcation No.: D71.
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1 Introduction
Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem regarding the impossibility of deﬁning a collective choice
rule possessing some seemingly innocuous properties is one of the most fundamental results
in the theory of collective decision-making. There have been numerous attempts to modify
his framework in order to avoid impossibilities, such as weakening some of his original
properties or departing from the stringent informational assumption that only ordinally
measurable and interpersonally non-comparable information on individual well-being is
available.
The route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem that we follow
in this paper consists of relaxing the requirement that the social ranking be an ordering
for all preference proﬁles under consideration. In this spirit, Sen (1969; 1970, Theorem
5*3) characterized the Pareto extension rule under the assumption that social preferences
are quasi-transitive but not necessarily transitive while retaining the completeness as-
sumption. Weymark (1984, Theorem 3) allowed social preferences to be incomplete but
imposed full transitivity and, as a result, obtained a characterization of the Pareto rule.
An interesting question that emerges in this context is what happens if transitivity
is weakened to consistency. Consistency, a property introduced by Suzumura (1976),
is intermediate in strength between transitivity and acyclicity and coincides with tran-
sitivity in the presence of reﬂexivity and completeness. It is logically independent of
quasi-transitivity and requires that there be no preference cycles with at least one strict
preference.
Consistency is of importance because, as Suzumura (1976) demonstrated, it is neces-
sary and suﬃcient for the existence of an ordering extension; that is, a binary relation
R can be extended to an ordering respecting all (weak and strict) preferences according
to R if and only if R is consistent. This fundamental insight represents a signiﬁcant
strengthening of the classical extension theorem and its variants due to Szpilrajn (1930),
establishing that the transitivity of an incomplete relation is suﬃcient for the existence
of an ordering extension. Because consistency constitutes the weakest possible coherence
property that needs to be satisﬁed if we do not want to give up all hope of compatibil-
ity with an ordering, consistency appears to be the natural weakening of the transitivity
requirement, particularly in the absence of completeness.
In spite of its importance and signiﬁcance, consistency has received relatively little
attention in the past (see Bossert, 2006, for an overview of its application, such as the
analysis of rational choice due to Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2005). In this paper,
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we examine the consequences of weakening transitivity to consistency in the context of
Arrow’s theorem. It turns out that, in some circumstances, consistency permits a much
larger class of possible collective choice rules as compared to those that become available
if completeness is dropped as a requirement on a social relation but the full force of
transitivity is retained.
The axioms we impose are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neu-
trality. If there are at least as many alternatives as there are agents, an alternative
characterization of the Pareto rule is obtained. The diﬀerence between this characteriza-
tion and Weymark’s is that we weaken the transitivity requirement imposed on the social
ordering to consistency and strengthen independence of irrelevant alternatives to neutral-
ity. However, if there are fewer alternatives than agents, additional rules satisfy the above
axioms. We characterize all of them and obtain the above-mentioned new axiomatization
of the Pareto rule as a special case. Especially in applications where there are many voters
and relatively few candidates (this is the case for political elections, to name a prominent
and important example), our result shows that it is possible to go considerably beyond
the limitations of unanimity imposed by the Pareto rule. This is achieved at little cost
because consistency still ensures the existence of an ordering consistent with the social
relation and, therefore, this paper opens up substantial new possibilities in the design of
collective choice mechanisms.
In addition, this paper develops a new approach to the analysis of collective choice rules
in the sense that it does not rely on previously applied proof techniques. In particular,
tools such as Sen’s (1979) ﬁeld expansion lemmas which allow one to extend “local”
observations to arbitrary collections of alternatives crucially rely on transitivity (or quasi-
transitivity), and consistency is not suﬃcient to obtain these types of results. Therefore, a
novel approach to identifying the class of collective choice rules compatible with standard
axioms is called for when working with consistency, and we believe that the techniques
developed here will prove useful in numerous other applications.
The following section introduces our basic deﬁnitions along with a preliminary ob-
servation. Section 3 contains the statement and proof of our characterization result and
Section 4 concludes with some examples designed to illustrate some important features of
our characterization.
2
2 Preliminaries
Suppose there is a set of alternatives X containing at least three elements, that is, |X| ≥
3 where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. The population is N = {1, . . . , |N |} with
|N | ∈ N \ {1}, where N denotes the set of all natural numbers. Let R ⊆ X × X be a
(binary) relation. For simplicity, we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R and ¬ xRy instead
of (x, y) ∈ R. The asymmetric factor P of R is deﬁned by
xPy ⇔ [xRy and ¬ yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. The symmetric factor I of R is deﬁned by
xIy ⇔ [xRy and yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, that is, xRy means that
x is considered at least as good as y, then P and I are the strict preference relation and
the indiﬀerence relation corresponding to R.
A relation R is reﬂexive if and only if, for all x ∈ X,
xRx
and R is complete if and only if, for all x, y ∈ X such that x = y,
xRy or yRx.
Furthermore, R is transitive if and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ xRz
and R is quasi-transitive if and only if P is transitive. R is consistent if and only if, for
all M ∈ N \ {1, 2} and for all x1, . . . , xM ∈ X,
xm−1Rxm ∀m ∈ {2, . . . ,M} ⇒ ¬ xMPx1
and, ﬁnally, R is acyclical if and only if, for all M ∈ N\{1, 2} and for all x1, . . . , xM ∈ X,
xm−1Pxm ∀m ∈ {2, . . . ,M} ⇒ ¬ xMPx1.
Transitivity implies consistency which, in turn, implies acyclicity but the reverse impli-
cations are not true in general. However, if R is reﬂexive and complete, transitivity and
consistency are equivalent.
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An ordering is a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation. If R is an ordering,
there is no ambiguity in using chains of individual preferences involving more than two
alternatives; for instance, xPyPz means that x is better than y which, in turn, is better
than z and, by the transitivity of R, x is better than z.
The set of all orderings on X is denoted by R and its |N |-fold Cartesian product is
R|N |. The set of all reﬂexive and transitive relations on X is T , and the set of all reﬂexive
and consistent relations on X is denoted by C. The set of all binary relations on X is B.
A proﬁle is a |N |-tuple R = (R1, . . . , R|N |) ∈ R|N |.
A collective choice rule is a mapping f :D → B where D ⊆ R|N | is the domain of
this function, assumed to be non-empty. A consistent collective choice rule is a collective
choice rule f such that f(R) ∈ C for all R ∈ D, and a transitive collective choice rule
is a collective choice rule f such that f(R) ∈ T for all R ∈ D. Note that, because
D ⊆ R|N |, we retain the assumption that all admissible proﬁles are composed of individual
preferences which are orderings. On the other hand, we allow social preferences to be
incomplete and we permit violations of transitivity as long as consistency is satisﬁed.
For each proﬁle R ∈ D, R = f(R) is the social preference corresponding to R, and
P and I are the strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation corresponding
to R. We use B(x, y;R) to denote the set of individuals such that x ∈ X is better
than y ∈ X in the proﬁle R ∈ R|N |, that is, for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N |,
B(x, y;R) = {i ∈ N | xPiy}.
An example for a transitive (and, thus, consistent) collective choice rule is the Pareto
rule f p:R|N | → B deﬁned by Rp = f p(R), where
xRpy ⇔ [xRiy ∀i ∈ N ]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N |.
The following lemma, which will be of use in the proof of our main result, establishes
that the cardinalities of these sets satisfy a triangle inequality.
Lemma 1 For all x, y, z ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N |,
|B(x, z;R)| ≤ |B(x, y;R)|+ |B(y, z;R)|.
Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X and R ∈ R|N |. First, we prove that
B(x, z;R) ⊆ B(x, y;R) ∪ B(y, z;R). (1)
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Suppose i ∈ B(x, y;R) ∪ B(y, z;R). Because individual preferences are complete, this
implies yRix and zRiy. By transitivity, zRix and, thus, i ∈ B(x, z;R), which proves (1).
Clearly, (1) implies
|B(x, z;R)| ≤ |B(x, y;R) ∪B(y, z;R)|.
Furthermore, we obviously must have
|B(x, y;R) ∪B(y, z;R)| ≤ |B(x, y;R)|+ |B(y, z;R)|.
Combining the last two inequalities yields the desired result.
The following axioms are standard in the literature on social choice.
Unrestricted domain. D = R|N |.
Strong Pareto. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ D,
(i) xRiy ∀i ∈ N ⇒ xRy;
(ii) [xRiy ∀i ∈ N and ∃j ∈ N such that xPjy] ⇒ xPy.
Anonymity. For all bijections ρ:N → N and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
Ri = R
′
ρ(i) ∀i ∈ N ⇒ R = R′.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
[xRiy ⇔ xR′iy and yRix ⇔ yR′ix] ∀i ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ xR′y and yRx ⇔ yR′x].
Neutrality. For all x, y, z, w ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
[xRiy ⇔ zR′iw and yRix ⇔ wR′iz] ∀i ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ zR′w and yRx ⇔ wR′z].
As is straightforward to verify, the Pareto rule satisﬁes all of the axioms introduced above.
3 Consistent Collective Choice Rules
Weymark (1984, Theorem 3) has shown that the Pareto rule is the only transitive collective
choice rule satisfying unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and independence
of irrelevant alternatives. As a corollary to our main result, we will obtain an alternative
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characterization that is obtained by strengthening independence of irrelevant alternatives
to neutrality and weakening transitivity to consistency. To describe all collective choice
rules satisfying our requirements, we introduce some additional deﬁnitions. Let
S = {(w, ) ∈ {0, . . . , |N |}2 | 0 ≤ |X| < w +  ≤ |N |} ∪ {(0, 0)}
and, furthermore, deﬁne
Σ = {S ⊆ S | (w, 0) ∈ S ∀w ∈ {0, . . . , |N |}}.
For S ∈ Σ, deﬁne the S-rule fS:R|N | → B by RS = fS(R), where
xRSy ⇔ [∃(w, ) ∈ S such that |B(x, y;R)| = w and |B(y, x;R)| = ]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N |. The set S speciﬁes the pairs of numbers of agents
who have to consider an alternative x better (respectively worse) than an alternative y in
order to obtain a weak preference of x over y according to the proﬁle under consideration.
Clearly, because only the number of individuals matters and not their identities, the
resulting rule is anonymous. Analogously, neutrality is satisﬁed because these numbers do
not depend on the alternatives to be ranked. Strong Pareto follows from the requirement
that the pairs (w, 0) be in S in the deﬁnition of Σ. Reﬂexivity of the social relation follows
from the reﬂexivity of the individual preferences and the observation that (0, 0) ∈ S for
all S ∈ Σ. As will be shown in the proof of our characterization result, the social relation
RS is consistent due to the restrictions imposed on the pairs (w, ) in the deﬁnition of
S. Conversely, the S-rules are the only rules satisfying our axioms. Thus, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 A consistent collective choice rule f satisﬁes unrestricted domain, strong
Pareto, anonymity and neutrality if and only if there exists S ∈ Σ such that f = fS.
Proof. ‘If.’ As mentioned before the theorem statement, that the S-rules satisfy un-
restricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality is straightforward to verify.
Because reﬂexivity is obvious, it remains to establish that RS = fS(R) is consistent for
all S ∈ Σ and for all R ∈ R|N |. Let S ∈ Σ and suppose, by way of contradiction, that
there exist R ∈ R|N |, M ∈ N \ {1, 2} and x1, . . . , xM ∈ X such that xm−1RSxm for all
m ∈ {2, . . . ,M} and xMP Sx1. By deﬁnition of RS, there exist (w1, 1), . . . , (wM , M) ∈ S
such that |B(xm−1, xm;R)| = wm−1 and |B(xm, xm−1;R)| = m−1 for all m ∈ {2, . . . ,M}.
6
Furthermore, we must have |B(xM , x1;R)| = wM and |B(x1, xM ;R)| = M with wM pos-
itive; if wM = 0, we have (wM , M) = (0, 0) by deﬁnition of S and it follows that x1ISxM ,
contrary to our hypothesis xMP Sx1.
If max {1, . . . , M} = 0, (repeated if necessary) application of Lemma 1 yields
|B(x3, x1;R)| ≤ |B(x3, x2;R)|+ |B(x2, x1;R)|,
...
|B(xM , x1;R)| ≤ |B(xM , xM−1;R)|+ . . . + |B(x2, x1;R)| = 0.
But this contradicts our earlier observation that |B(xM , x1;R)| = wM > 0.
If max {1, . . . , M} > 0, suppose this maximum is achieved at m for some m ∈
{1, . . . ,M}. By deﬁnition of S, |X| ≥ 3 > 0 and wm + m > |X|m together rule out the
possibility that wm + m > |X|wm and, therefore, we must have (m, wm) ∈ S and the
preference corresponding to the mth element in the chain is strict. This, in turn, allows
us to assume, without loss of generality, that m = M ; this can be achieved with a simple
relabeling of the elements in our chain if required. Invoking Lemma 1 again and using
the maximality of M , we obtain
|B(x3, x1;R)| ≤ |B(x3, x2;R)|+ |B(x2, x1;R)| ≤ 2M
...
|B(xM , x1;R)| ≤ |B(xM , xM−1;R)|+ . . . + |B(x2, x1;R)| ≤ (M − 1)M .
Because M ≤ |X|, this implies
|B(xM , x1;R)| ≤ (|X| − 1)M . (2)
By assumption and by the deﬁnition of S, we have |B(xM , x1;R)| = wM > (|X| − 1)M ,
a contradiction to (2).
‘Only if.’ Suppose f is a consistent collective choice rule satisfying the axioms of the
theorem statement. Let
S = {(w, ) | ∃ x, y ∈ X and R ∈ R|N | such that
|B(x, y;R)| = w, |B(y, x;R)| =  and xRy}.
By anonymity and neutrality, S is such that the relation R is equal to RS. It remains to
show that S ∈ Σ. That (w, 0) ∈ S for all w ∈ {0, . . . , |N |} follows from strong Pareto.
Clearly, for all (w, ) ∈ S, |X| ≥ 0 and w +  ≤ |N |.
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As an auxiliary result, we show that
w >  (3)
for all (w, ) ∈ S \ {(0, 0)}. By way of contradiction, suppose that w ≤  for some
(w, ) ∈ S \ {(0, 0)}. Because (w, ) = (0, 0) by assumption, this implies  > 0 and, by
strong Pareto, w > 0. By unrestricted domain and the assumption |X| ≥ 3, we can
choose x, y, z ∈ X and R ∈ R|N | so that
xPiyPiz ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , w}
and
yPizPix ∀i ∈ { + 1, . . . ,  + w}.
Furthermore, if w < , let
yPixPiz ∀i ∈ {w + 1, . . . , }
and if w +  < |N |, let
xIiyIiz ∀i ∈ {w +  + 1, . . . , |N |}.
Because |B(z, x;R)| = |B(x, y;R)| = w and |B(x, z;R)| = |B(y, x;R)| =  , we must
have zRx and xRy. By strong Pareto, it follows that yPz and we obtain a contradiction
to the consistency of R. This establishes (3).
To complete the proof, we have to show that w +  > |X| for all (w, ) ∈ S \ {(0, 0)}.
By way of contradiction, suppose this is not true. Then there exists a pair (w0, 0) ∈
S \ {(0, 0)} such that w0 + 0 ≤ |X|0 or, equivalently,
w0 ≤ (|X| − 1)0. (4)
Combining (3), which is true for all (w, ) ∈ S \ {(0, 0)} and thus for (w0, 0), with (4),
we obtain
0 < w0 ≤ (|X| − 1)0. (5)
Clearly, 0 = 0 is inconsistent with (5). Thus, 0 > 0.
(3) immediately implies that, for any (w, ) ∈ S \ {(0, 0)}, (, w) ∈ S. Thus, in
particular, whenever |B(x, y;R)| = w0 and |B(y, x;R)| = 0, we must have xPy and not
merely xRy.
We now distinguish two cases. The ﬁrst of these occurs whenever w0 is a positive
multiple of 0. That is, given (5), there exists β ∈ {3, . . . , |X|} such that w0 = (β −
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1)0 (and, thus, w0 + 0 = β0). By unrestricted domain, we can choose β alternatives
x1, . . . , xβ ∈ X and a proﬁle R ∈ R|N | such that
x1Pix
2Pi . . . Pix
β−1Pixβ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 0},
x2Pix
3Pi . . . Pix
βPix
1 ∀i ∈ {0 + 1, . . . , 20},
...
xβ−1PixβPix1Pi . . . Pixβ−2 ∀i ∈ {(β − 2)0 + 1, . . . , (β − 1)0},
xβPix
1Pi . . . Pix
β−2Pixβ−1 ∀i ∈ {(β − 1)0 + 1, . . . , β0}
and, if |N | > w0 + 0 = β0,
x1Iix
2Ii . . . Iix
β−1Iixβ ∀i ∈ {w0 + 0 + 1, . . . , |N |}.
We have |B(xm−1, xm;R)| = (β − 1)0 = w0 and |B(xm, xm−1;R)| = 0 for all m ∈
{2, . . . , β} and, furthermore, |B(xβ, x1;R)| = (β − 1)0 = w0 and |B(x1, xβ;R)| = 0.
Therefore, xm−1Pxm for all m ∈ {2, . . . , β} and xβPx1, contradicting the consistency of
R.
Finally, we consider the case in which w0 is not a positive multiple of 0. Clearly, this
is only possible if 0 > 1. By (5), there exists α ∈ {3, . . . , |X|} such that
(α− 2)0 < w0 < (α− 1)0. (6)
By unrestricted domain, we can consider α alternatives x1, . . . , xα ∈ X and a proﬁle
R ∈ R|N | such that
x2Pix
3Pi . . . Pix
αPix
1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 0},
...
xα−1PixαPix1Pi . . . Pixα−2 ∀i ∈ {(α− 3)0 + 1, . . . , (α− 2)0},
xαPix
1Pi . . . Pix
α−2Pixα−1 ∀i ∈ {(α− 2)0 + 1, . . . , w0},
x1Pix
2Pi . . . Pix
α−1Pixα ∀i ∈ {w0 + 1, . . . , 2w0 − (α− 2)0},
x1Pix
αPix
2Pi . . . Pix
α−1 ∀i ∈ {2w0 − (α− 2)0 + 1, . . . , w0 + 0}
and, if |N | > w0 + 0,
x1Iix
2Ii . . . Iix
α−1Iixα ∀i ∈ {w0 + 0 + 1, . . . , |N |}.
This proﬁle is well-deﬁned because (6) implies
w0 < 2w0 − (α− 2)0 < w0 + 0.
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We have |B(xm−1, xm;R)| = w0 and |B(xm, xm−1;R)| = 0 for all m ∈ {2, . . . , α} and,
furthermore, |B(xα, x1;R)| = w0 and |B(x1, xα;R)| = 0. Therefore, xm−1Pxm for all
m ∈ {2, . . . , α} and xαPx1, again contradicting the consistency of R.
4 Examples
Clearly, the Pareto rule is a special case of the rules characterized in the previous section;
it is obtained for S = {(w, 0) | w ∈ {0, . . . , |N |}}. If |X| ≥ |N |, this is the only rule
satisfying the axioms of the theorem statement. This is the case because only pairs (w, )
where  = 0 are in S in the presence of this inequality. To see this, suppose, to the
contrary, that there exists (w, ) ∈ S such that  > 0. Because (w, ) ∈ S, it follows
that |N | ≥ w +  > |X| > 0. Combined with |X| ≥ |N |, this implies |N | > |N |
which is impossible if  > 0. Thus, if |X| ≥ |N |, our theorem provides an alternative
characterization of the Pareto rule. This axiomatization diﬀers from Weymark’s (1984) in
that independence of irrelevant alternatives is strengthened to neutrality and transitivity is
weakened to consistency. Note that, in this case, transitivity is implied by the conjunction
of consistency and the axioms employed in our theorem.
However, if |X| < |N |, the Pareto rule is not the only rule satisfying the axioms of
Theorem 1. For example, consider the collective choice rule fS corresponding to the set
S = {(w, 0) | w ∈ {0, . . . , |N |}} ∪ {(|N | − 1, 1)}. For (w, ) = (|N | − 1, 1), we have
|N | = |N | − 1 + 1 = w +  = |N | · 1 > |X| > 0 and, thus, the relevant inequalities are
satisﬁed.
Once rules other than the Pareto rule are available, transitivity is no longer guaranteed
(but, of course, all S-rules are consistent as established in our theorem). For example,
suppose X = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, S = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0), (3, 1)} and
consider the proﬁle R deﬁned by
xP1yP1z,
xP2yP2z,
zP3xP3y,
yP4zP4x.
According to RS = fS(R), we have xP Sy and yP Sz because |B(x, y;R)| = |B(y, z;R)| =
3 and |B(y, x;R)| = |B(z, y;R)| = 1. But |B(x, z;R)| = |B(z, x;R)| = 2 and, thus,
¬ xRSz so that RS is not transitive (not even quasi-transitive).
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An interesting feature of the S-rules is that there may be “gaps” in the set of possible
values of w or  within a rule. For instance, suppose X = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
and S = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0), (5, 0), (6, 0), (7, 0), (5, 2)}. Consider the pair
(w, ) = (5, 2). We have |N | = w +  = 7 > 6 = 3 · 2 = |X| > 0 and, thus, fS is
well-deﬁned. In addition to the rankings generated by unanimity, ﬁve agents can ensure
a superior ranking of an alternative over another against two agents with the opposite
preference but, on the other hand, if six agents prefer x to y and one agent prefers y to
x, non-comparability results.
The conclusion of Theorem 1 does not hold if merely independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives rather than neutrality is imposed. Suppose x0, y0 ∈ X are two distinct alternatives.
Deﬁne a collective choice rule by letting
xRy ⇔ [xRpy or (¬ xRpy and ¬ yRpx and {x, y} = {x0, y0})]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N |. This is a consistent collective choice rule satisfying
unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives. However, neutrality clearly is violated.
Consistency cannot be weakened to acyclicity in our characterization result. The
collective choice rule deﬁned by letting
xRy ⇔ [xRpy or |B(x, y;R)| = |B(y, x;R)| = 1]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ R|N | produces acyclical social preferences and satisﬁes
the axioms of Theorem 1. However, social preferences are not always consistent. For
example, suppose X = {x, y, z} and N = {1, 2, 3}, and consider the proﬁle R deﬁned by
xP1yP1z,
zP2xP2y,
xI3yI3z.
According to R = f(R), we obtain xPy, yIz and zIx, a social preference relation that is
not consistent.
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